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Most research on decision making has focused on how human or animal decision mak-
ers choose between two or more options, posed in advance by the researchers. The
mechanisms by which options are generated for most decisions, however, are not well
understood. Models of sequential search have examined the trade-off between continued
exploration and choosing one’s current best option, but still cannot explain the processes
by which new options are generated. We argue that understanding the origins of options
is a crucial but untapped area for decision making research. We explore a number of fac-
tors which inﬂuence the generation of options, which fall broadly into two categories:
psycho-biological and socio-cultural. The former category includes factors such as percep-
tual biases and associative memory networks. The latter category relies on the incredible
human capacity for culture and social learning, which doubtless shape not only our choices
but the options available for choice. Our intention is to start a discussion that brings us
closer toward understanding the origins of options.
Keywords: decision making, options, choice, goals, neuroeconomics, culture
INTRODUCTION
Neuroscientists and psychologists studying decision making gen-
erally follow a standard practice borrowed from economics, which
is to assume a solitary decision maker who is presented with a set
of options and asked to choose among them. The quintessential
mathematical formulations of choice, decision theory and game
theory, deal exclusively with actors with a ﬁnite and completely
known set of action choices, and this framework has allowed for
the development of coherent formal theories of economic, polit-
ical, and evolutionary organization. This practice has also been
fruitful for the experimental sciences: we have learned much about
the psychological factors that inﬂuence decisions in ways contrary
to the rational ideal of Homo economicus, and have uncovered neu-
rophysiological mechanisms by which we process and assess those
options. If we pull back from the domain of economic decision
theory, however, we ﬁnd that very few choices are made in this
way. We are rarely given an explicit set of options from which
to choose, or even an obvious goal toward which we can strive
to optimize our choices. Rather, we make myriad decisions daily
based on competing goals and options. Those options come not
from a predetermined and ready-made basket, but are vaulted into
the mind from sources that are not well understood. Uncovering
those sources and classifying that order is therefore a task of vital
importance to the sciences of decision making.
There is an important distinction between the act of choos-
ing among options and the process by which those options are
generated (Figure 1). The former is well studied in the ﬁelds of
neuroscience, psychology, and behavioral economics. The latter
has barely been studied at all. When an individual makes a choice,
she evaluates a number of options in terms of her desired goal
(or set of goals), using internal cognitive processes and perceptual
information from the environment to select an action (Kahneman
and Tversky, 2000; Cisek, 2007). Some researchers have also noted
that organisms interact dynamically with the environment, and
therefore the set of options is not static but rather shifts with the
circumstances, with options competing for dominance based on
available internal and external information (Cisek and Kalaska,
2010). This dynamic view of organism and environment is more
realistic, but it still begs a question. Individuals must generate
options for evaluation. Where do these options come from?
From a perspective of naïve epistemology, humans have a near
inﬁnite number of options available at any moment. Walking into
a restaurant, for example, one usually thinks of the salient choice
as being between which table to seat oneself, if such an act is per-
mitted, or if it is not, of there being no choice at all but to go and
see the host (or maître d’, depending on the fanciness of the estab-
lishment) to await seating. But there are countless other options.
You could smack the headwaiter in the face. You could burst into
song. Leap up on a table and tap dance. Try to walk through a wall.
Take a nap on the ﬂoor. Drool. Check your watch. Scratch your
leg. Stage a holdup. Turn around and leave. If there are limitless
options, how are we ever to make any intelligent decisions?
The solution is that the operational set of options is not limit-
less. We are interested in the many processes that lead up to choice
in the sense that it is usually modeled, the choice among a small
set of options directly leading to action. Some of the near inﬁ-
nite number of theoretical options are not present at the point
of decision because they have not been invented by the decision
maker or communicated by some other individual. Holding up a
restaurant is not an option unless you have learned how to use
a pistol. Some options may be masked and others activated by
many processes. For example, holding up a restaurant is masked
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FIGURE 1 | Actions are selected through processes that evaluate
options in terms of a given goal or set of goals (including
subgoals).This evaluation utilizes information from internal
processes, including memories and affective states, as well as
perceptual feedback from the environment. These internal and
external processes also contribute to the initial generation of options,
but the mechanisms for doing so are much less well understood than
are those for evaluation.
for most people by a general commitment to being law abiding.
Contrariwise, for some young males with poor job prospects and
skills with a ﬁrearm, entering any prosperous business may acti-
vate an assessment of the prospects for a successful holdup. Many
acts are not the result of choice at all. For example, when a behav-
ior becomes habitual, the options are reduced to one; we enter
our favorite restaurant for breakfast, sit at our usual table, and
order our standard item without consulting the menu. Only a sin-
gle option is salient even though the readily available menu lists
a dozen or more. Throughout this paper, we will use “options” to
denote those behaviors that are actually considered by an individ-
ual, consciously or unconsciously, rather than the inﬁnite set of all
possible actions.
Whether an option is considered has a lot to do with an indi-
vidual’s goals. A person who had been awake for days and wasn’t
concerned with social appearances might very well sit on the ﬂoor
for a nap if he found himself in a restaurant (or anywhere else,
for that matter). Goals inﬂuence choice in fundamental ways.
An individual chooses from among actions in order to achieve
a goal. Sometimes certain subgoals must be achieved en route to
the superordinate goal, and actions will be selected to accomplish
these (Brooks, 1991). Goals, in turn, may change dynamically in
response to internal processes and external stimuli, and therefore
understanding how goals interact with choice among a static set
of options is a challenge in itself. Goals also play an important
role in the generation of options, since goals help to deﬁne the
cognitive and perceptual salience of potential behaviors (Minsky,
1985). That being said, goals inﬂuence the domain in which we
search for options, but options are not fully deﬁned by goals. Even
if a goal is singular and extremely well-deﬁned, which is rarely the
case in natural settings, there are still a number of factors that will
inﬂuence the available options. Some of these are provided by the
environment itself – you cannot act upon what is not there, and
what is there will be a source for ideas. Other factors are internal –
options are inﬂuenced by an individual’s memories, motivational
states, and personality. As social organisms, however, humans do
not make decisions in a social void. Social and cultural factors
inﬂuence the generation of options – we learn from each other,
obey cultural norms, and respond to social inﬂuence. Thus a con-
siderable number of processes interact with goals to lead to the
options the decision maker comes to entertain.
Theproblemof options is related to a classic conundrum in cog-
nitive science and artiﬁcial intelligence called the “frame”problem
(Dennett, 1984; Shanahan, 2009). Given a task at hand, one needs
to determine a set of options for evaluation, but this cannot be
obtained simply by eliminating all the ineffective options, because
the list of such options is effectively inﬁnite, and an individual
has limited time and computing power for decision making. Nor
can the individual explicitly determine which options are irrele-
vant, because that still requires the discrete consideration of an
inﬁnite list. The frame problem is often formalized as a search for
a set of generalized axioms that allow an individual to consider
only relevant actions (Shanahan, 2009); however, a computational
model that solved the frame problem for an actor of human-level
complexity would effectively describe how options are generated.
It is worth noting that subjects in many decision making
experiments evaluate choices that are not necessarily a priori “cor-
rect.” In addition to decisions concerning the optimization of an
externally dictated reward, researchers have also considered actor-
center choices evaluated on the basis of individual priorities. These
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two categories of decisions have been respectively referred to as
veridical and adaptive decision making (Goldberg and Podell,
1999; Mograbi, 2011). While veridical decisions always have a
best response, adaptive decision making experiments can shed
light on how options are evaluated based on innate and learned
preferences in such diverse domains as food (Arana et al., 2003;
Paulus and Frank, 2003), leisure activities (Chaudry et al., 2009),
esthetics (Goldberg and Podell, 1999), occupation (Nakao et al.,
2009), altruistic behavior (Moll et al., 2006; Rilling et al., 2008),
and moral decision making (Cikara et al., 2010; Kahane et al.,
2011). Nevertheless, experiments in both veridical and adaptive
decision making overwhelmingly tend to supply participants with
predetermined options, and therefore still fail to shed light on the
origins of options.
So, returning to the restaurant, why don’t we punch the waiter
in the face? The rational response to this question is: why would
we? To most people, this action has nothing to do with any salient
goals, and therefore is not considered, even unconsciously. If, how-
ever, you are a jealous man, and the waiter has recently stolen your
girlfriend, then voilà! Punching him becomes an option. That does
not mean that you will choose this action – after all, you may be
aware that this choice could land you in unwanted trouble – but
it is considered where in the previous case it wasn’t. Continuing
this line of thought, let’s now imagine that you have been look-
ing for this man for the express purpose of punching him in the
face. Now, even though it wasn’t your active goal a moment before
you entered the restaurant, the sight of him makes you change
gears and rush toward him, ﬁsts ﬂailing. This new action plan, of
course, entails a whole set of choices to be made, with the avail-
ability of speciﬁc options restricting the set of possible behaviors
in the processing of those choices.
Whatever the situation, an individual’s course of action will
dependonhis evaluationof his available options,but those options
are in turn inﬂuenced by a variety of factors – environmental,
personal, and socio-cultural. These options are not necessarily
available simultaneously for comparison. Decision makers may
instead evaluate a sequential series of options, considering fur-
ther solutions only until one is found that is satisfactory (Kahan
et al., 1967). The process of considering options one at a time
until a choice is made is known as sequential search, and can
be characterized by a choice between selecting one’s best cur-
rent option (“exploitation”) vs. continuing to search for a better
solution (“exploration”). This is a classic problem in decisionmak-
ing, and has been extensively studied in neuroscience, economics,
ecology, and computer science, but it is not the problem under
consideration here. The complexities involved in the origins of
options are fundamentally distinct from those of sequential search,
recently framed (Cohen et al., 2007) in the immortal words of the
Clash: should I stay or should I go? Once the decision to go has
been made, the question becomes: where do I go, and how do I get
there?
In this paper, we will consider how scientists might start think-
ing seriously about the origins of options. First,wewill expand that
discovering these origins cannot be achieved through solutions to
sequential search problems, a traditional technique in decision
making research. Following that, we will start fresh and discuss
some of the factors involved in the generation of options, with
the hope that a detailed enumeration of these factors will clarify
the problem and inspire future work. First, we will brieﬂy discuss
the role of the environment on options. Next, we will explore the
individual-level psycho-biological factors most familiar to neu-
roscientists and cognitive psychologists, which include things like
memory and affect.Wewill thendiscuss the role socio-cultural fac-
tors on the origins of options in human decision making. While
decisions are made by individuals, the intensely social nature of
humankind necessitates the consideration of social and cultural
forces. Finally, we will consider the implications and limitations of
the ideas presented here.
SEQUENTIAL SEARCH
In choosing an example for the case of well-deﬁned options, we
used a situation in a restaurant. Why? It was likely chosen because
the ﬁrst draft of this paper was written in a café, and our mental
models (Johnson-Laird, 1983) related to restaurants were primed.
It is possible that other scenarios were evaluated, but more likely
that we stuck with the ﬁrst thing that came to mind. If “restaurant”
was a satisfactory choice, then we likely deemed it “good enough,”
andproceeded. If wehadnot been able to ﬁnd a suitable example in
the context of a restaurant, then we may have begun a sequential
search for a more suitable choice. Most theoretical and experi-
mental work on decision making under conditions where not all
options are known to the decision maker have involved sequential
search (Kahan et al., 1967; Hunt et al., 1989; Real, 1990; Hutchin-
son and Meyer, 1994; Daw et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2007; Rendell
et al., 2010), including so-called “naturalistic decision making”
(Todd and Gigerenzer, 2001).
A sequential search is a two-stage process. An individual initi-
ates search and ﬁnds a possible candidate solution for her problem.
If the solution is not adequate, she searches again. In some cases, a
decision to discontinue the search is made only when the perfect
solution (if known) is found. In other cases, the search is discon-
tinued in favor of the current “best” solution when the estimated
cost of continuing the search outweighs the beneﬁt of retaining
the current solution. Optimal solutions for sequential search tasks
have been discovered for various conditions in economics (Gittins,
1979; McKenna, 1979), artiﬁcial intelligence (Russell and Norvig,
2010), and behavioral ecology (Luttbeg, 2002; Stamps et al., 2005;
Wiegmann et al., 2010), though the restriction of bounded ratio-
nality (Simon, 1990) makes it likely that evolved minds evaluate
search decisions with fast and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer et al.,
1999), such as satisﬁcing (i.e., choosing the ﬁrst option to meet
some evaluation threshold; Simon, 1956).
If options are evaluated one at a time (or even in parallel)
with sequential search, then haven’t we reduced choice to two
options: search or stay? This is a fundamental decision, analo-
gous to the neuropsychological distinction between approach and
withdrawal behaviors (Kinsbourne, 1993), and has received some
well-deserved attention in the neuroscience literature under the
computer science-inspired name of exploitation vs. exploration
(Daw et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2007). A problem endemic to
all models of sequential search, however, is that the individual
is assumed to know how to search. A mouse in search of a nest
site can choose the best spot he has found so far or continue to
search. This is a dichotomous choice, and one that may rely on a
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mental calculation of risk based on past experience. However, once
the decision has been made to continue searching, where does the
mouse look? While his options may not be technically inﬁnite, in a
complex environment such as those in which wild mice are found,
the search space is nonetheless alarmingly vast. Yet somehow, a
mouse searches for habitats without curling up in a fetal position
and rocking back and forth while squeaking to itself, overwhelmed
by an ocean of options. Similarly, a person entering a restaurant
is not driven mad by an inﬁnitude of possible behaviors. In fact,
the ease with which we make choices is remarkable. Our philoso-
phy departments are not littered with bafﬂed epistemologists, too
stunned by innumerable options to move.
The decision of whether to exploit or explore is a fundamental
component of decision making, but it does not capture how the
decision maker gathers the options for exploration. While much
decision making theory assumes that the structure of the environ-
ment presents an individual with clear choices, this is rarely the
case. Rather, our brains have evolved to detect salient features of
the environment, or dimensions along which to search for those
features. Those features and dimensions are then shaped and con-
strained by individual experiences and social factors,which in turn
shape and constrain the perceived environment. The options avail-
able to an individual decision maker in natural contexts emerge
organically from neural processes inﬂuenced by environmental,
psycho-biological, and socio-cultural factors, and are not usually
available a priori to an outside observer. We will now turn to
explore in more detail the role these factors play in generating
options.
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
The external environment shapes our options by providing struc-
ture to our behavior. This is so obvious that it will be given only
cursory treatment here. The option to build a snowman only
makes sense in a snowy environment; it is rarely ever considered
by indigenous Hawaiians. Environments are also more than just
rocks and trees and buildings and weather. Our environments also
include other individuals. For example, while economists have
noted the importance of market forces in constraining options,
this also extends to what Noë and Hammerstein (1994) have called
“biological markets” on the analogy of the markets that are so
important in presenting options in the case of humans. The avail-
ability of and demand for interaction partners inﬂuences the pools
from which we choose our friends, romantic partners, and busi-
ness relations. One’s position in a social network also inﬂuences
the spread of information to and from that individual, including
cultural norms and expectations (Christakis and Fowler, 2009).
How speciﬁc social factors inﬂuence perception and cognition will
be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent section but we must
ﬁrst recognize that the individuals with whom we interact—and
how those individuals are themselves socially connected—shape
the types of decisions we will be in a position to make as well
as the available options for those decisions (López-Pintado and
Watts, 2008; Zerubavel and Smith, 2010).
Finally, a decision may be made to alter the environment (phys-
ical, social, or both) in order to provide the individual with new
options. Gibson (1979) summed this up nicely when he posited
that perception of an object is intrinsically related to the behaviors
it affords the individual. Affordances are the passive natural ana-
log of the selling points that salespersons use to convince us to
buy their product. Options, then, are constrained by the potential
behaviors afforded by the environment.
PSYCHO-BIOLOGICAL FACTORS
All aspects of psychology emerge from the interplay of neuronal,
hormonal, and other biochemical processes. Psychology, then, is
biology, but the nature of psychological phenomena demands that
we abstract these phenomena in conceptual and linguistic terms
(rather than in purely physiological terms) in order to discuss
them coherently. In terms of decision making, it is often useful
to articulate constraints in psychological rather than physiological
terms. Here, we choose to use the designation “psycho-biological”
to emphasize the connection between the two levels of abstraction.
Whatever the articulation, there are a number of psycho-biological
factors that constrain the options available for decision processes.
The exploration of each of these in full would require much more
space than we have here; what follows is by no means a complete
list, but rather a broad survey of the mechanisms and processes
that constrain our construction of options.
PERCEPTUAL BIASES
We cannot choose what we cannot perceive. The senses of each
thinking organism have evolved to perceive the world in a way
that reﬂects the salient cues that have been important for survival
and reproduction throughout the species’ evolutionary history
(vonUexküll, 1934/1957).Anorganism’s evolved perceptual biases
therefore shape its options by dictating the relevant stimuli to
which it reacts. Primates, for example, evolved in a niche where
forward-facing eyes and good color vision were essential for navi-
gation, foraging, andpredator evasion. Swinging through trees and
navigating quickly through dense, three-dimensionally complex
forests requires good depth perception, and a dietary requirement
of ripe fruits necessitates the ability to distinguish the color sig-
nals of fruits and leaves that are ready to eat. Grazing mammals
such as deer or gazelles, on the other hand, have diets that are
less dependent on color cues, and so have less precise color vision.
They live in open plains, where they are vulnerable from predation
from all sides, and so have eyes on each side of their head, with
wide, oblong pupils for an almost completely panoramic visual
ﬁeld (Attenborough, 2002). Even closely related species have dif-
ferences in organization of the sensory cortex related to different
needs of their ecological niche, as demonstrated by recent work
on rodents (Campi and Krubitzer, 2010; Krubitzer et al., 2011).
Humans are famously unable to see the ultraviolet light, which
renders invisible to us the often-beautiful UV-reﬂective patterns
that guide many bird and insect species to ﬁnd food, mates, and
prey (Kevan et al., 2001).
These evolved biases have important effects on the ways organ-
isms solve problems in a given environment. For example, the
Norway Rat (Rattus norvegicus) is a semi-aquatic animal, and
therefore is well-equipped to solve hidden-platform water maze, a
common laboratory test of spatial learning. Mice, who in the wild
spend much less time in water, have more difﬁculty solving the
watermaze, relying less on spatial cues than on randommovement
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strategies (Frick et al., 2000). The Brazilian short-tailed opos-
sum (Monodelphis domestica), a rat-sized arboreal marsupial, is
generally unable to solve the hidden-platform task (Kimble and
Whishaw, 1994). Each of these animals should be physically able
to solve this task, but their evolved perceptual biases inﬂuence
the strategic options available to them. These biases therefore
inﬂuence the generation of options for decision making at a
fundamental level.
There may also be differences in perceptual biases within
species. These obviously include perceptual impairments such as
blindness (and color blindness), deafness, etc. In addition, genet-
ics and experience alter the salient options for decision making in
many ways, which are explored in the subsequent sections.
PERSONALITY
Personality refers to individual differences in general behavioral
tendencies, sometimes called behavioral syndromes when referring
to non-humans (Sih et al., 2004). In humans, personalities are rel-
atively stable throughout adulthood, though this stability largely
depends on the constancy of the social environment and the indi-
vidual’s role therein (Ardelt, 2000), and long-term changes can still
be effected by certain life-changing events (MacLean et al., 2011).
In the context of decision making, personalities refer to predictive
behavioral regularities within individuals, which are inﬂuenced by
complex interactions between genotype and developmental expe-
rience (Bouchard and Loehlin, 2001). Personality traits are useful
descriptors that help us predict individual decision making. For
example, riskier behavior for gains is correlated with increased
Openness to Experience and decreased Neuroticism (Lauriola and
Levin, 2001), and stable ambiguity-seeking tendencies have been
shown to predict decision making behavior under both risk and
ambiguity (Lauriola et al., 2007). The way in which reward is
processed in the brain is also mediated by certain personality traits
(Simon et al., 2010).
By deﬁning behavioral and perceptual tendencies (Shrauger
and Altrocchi, 1964; Perugini and Prestwich, 2007), personality
can inﬂuence the options available to a decision maker. Imagine
an individual going to a party where she does not know most of
the guests. Many of her decisions, and the options thereof, will
be dictated by personality-guided goals. If she is shy, she may try
to associate only with people she already knows, and may stick to
the edges of a room full of unfamiliar people. If she is thirsty, she
may wait, or nervously ask the host for a glass. A socially bold per-
son, on the other hand, might go directly to the refrigerator for a
drink, and enthusiastically seek out conversations with strangers.
Of course, it is possible that the shy person thought of going for the
fridge, but rejected the action. However, the bold person assumes
she will be liked (Sinclair and Lentz, 2010) and is unlikely to con-
sider slinking along the walls or sneaking out to get a drink at the
store around the block, while the shy person does. Importantly,
personality traits inﬂuence more than just the way options are
evaluated; they inﬂuence the determination of which options are
available for evaluation.
A recent study by Gino and Ariely (2012) gives a simple exam-
ple in a study of creativity, which can be characterized at least in
part as a measure of the diversity of options an individual can
generate. Subjects were given a difﬁcult visual perception task of
determining which of two adjacent triangles contained more cir-
cles, and could receive cash rewards. However, reward payoffs were
not determined by accuracy but by absolute behavior: guessing the
right triangle always paid off 10 times more than guessing the left.
It was found that measures of creativity (a personality trait) cor-
related with the tendency to proﬁt maximize rather than guess
correctly. Though the authors characterize this behavior as dis-
honesty, a more parsimonious explanation of their results is that
the possibility of “cheating” to maximize proﬁts rather than per-
form as instructed simply did not occur to less creative individuals.
As the authors note, “creativity may lead people to think of more
and diverse ways they could beneﬁt from the monetary gains from
cheating, thus making cheating itself more tempting” (p. 11).
AFFECT
Affect is a broad term used to encompass moods, emotions, atti-
tudes, evaluations, and preferences (Zeelenberg et al., 2008). Here
we use the term to contrast with personality traits, which are more
stable over the long-term; we deﬁne affective states as those sit-
uationally inﬂuenced brain states that alter the processing and
prioritization of stimuli and behavioral choices. Though the vari-
able nature of affect is often ignored by decision theorists, affective
states are clearly a guiding factor in deciding among choices
(Bechara et al., 2000; Zeelenberg et al., 2008). Zajonc (1980) has
proposed, for example, that all perceptions contain some affect:
we see not just a house but a nice house, an ugly house, etc.
Building on this, Slovic et al. (2007) have proposed thatmany deci-
sions are made using an affect heuristic. In these cases, the broad
feelings associated with various options drive our choices more
than a rational (proﬁt-maximizing) evaluation of the associated
payoffs. A similar idea has also been developed by Cunningham
et al. (2007), with the additional proviso that evaluations are iter-
atively processed as relevant attitudes and associations are realized
through spreading activation.
What is still overlooked, however, is that the options for many
decisions are also guided by an individual’s affective state. Emo-
tions, for example, may determine which goals are most salient,
and therefore which options will come to the forefront (Zeelen-
berg et al., 2008). Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio,
1994; Bechara and Damasio, 2005) posits that the emotions expe-
rienced at the onset of and in response to a situation will bias the
response options by activating in working memory those choices
made in similar emotional states. Whether a person is angry, tired,
hungry, manic, sad, or scared not only inﬂuences how she evalu-
ates a set of options, but, given a minimal degree of agency, will
inﬂuence what decisions are most important, and which options
are available for consideration.
MEMORY AND LEARNING
Complex organisms are able to develop, adapt, and survive not
only because they have been evolutionarily selected to do so,
but also because the stimuli and experiences are internalized to
guide future perceptions and decisions. This, of course, is learning,
and the persistent effects of learning on cognition fall under the
classiﬁcation of memory. Memory obviously inﬂuences decision
making in terms of the prior knowledge we can use to evaluate
our decisions, whether in the Bayesian sense of prior probability
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distributions,or in terms of the relevant schemas andmentalmod-
els used to evaluate situations. Memory is also related to affect, in
the sense that one’s previous affective associations with a situation
or option can guide choice (Damasio, 1994; Bechara and Damasio,
2005; Slovic et al., 2007). Memory can be an important factor in
one’s motivational state,which we have already shown to inﬂuence
the selection of options.
Since options must arise from the interplay of salient (exter-
nal or internal) stimuli and preexisting cognitive structure, it is
unsurprising that memory should be involved in inﬂuencing the
origins of options. Perhaps the clearest inﬂuence of memory on
the emergence of options is in the determination of the current
goal or motivational state. As a simple example, consider a rodent
exploring a dark arena. Research on Tristram’s jird (Meriones tris-
trami), a nocturnal rodent native in the Middle East, has shown
that the animal has at least two distinct methods of exploration
depending on its experience in the arena (Avni et al., 2006). At ﬁrst,
it “loops” around somewhat aimlessly, probably to gather enough
spatial information to establish one or more “home bases.” Once
a representation of the arena is internalized, the animal switches
to “home-base behavior,” in which it makes short excursions from
a preferred location, returning to the same location each time.
Knowledge of the neural processes involved in this kind of spatial
learning, at least in the hippocampal formation, is quite advanced
(Moser et al., 2008). In this example, the animal must decide where
to go (or whether to stay put), but the method for this decision
process is determined by a mental schema dictated by the animal’s
knowledge of the space.
Consider also the well-known inﬂuence of expertise in human
decision making. A chess grandmaster can easily recall complex
(but plausible) board positions and can make well-considered
decisions with ease, which contrasts with the difﬁculty in both
memorization and strategy found in chess novices (Simon, 1987).
The grandmaster has not only memorized board positions, but
has also internalized schemas and strategies, and can thus think
many moves in advance, a difﬁculty for novices. Previous experi-
ence certainly inﬂuences the evaluation of choice options, but it
also allows for the consideration of different options. Therefore,
the difference between a master and a novice is not just the speed
of search; through experience, the master has options unavail-
able to the beginner and conversely may not consider options that
inexperienced players do. Even in chess, with a ﬁnite number of
possible moves each turn, the expert may choose not only to make
a particular move, but to embark on a planned series of moves, for
which the choice of moves and the evaluation of the opponent’s
moves are phenomenologically quite different than for the novice
who chooses one move at a time. For more naturalistic decisions,
the inﬂuence of experience on the generation of options can be
even more severe and nuanced.
Individual learning is an error prone process. The informa-
tion transferred in social learning processes is not always received
without error either, nor are memories necessarily recalled with-
out inaccuracies. We may misinterpret a communication not only
because of imperfect perception, but also due to our own expec-
tations and prior knowledge. Our memories are also imperfect,
and we often ﬁll in details of recalled events with conjectures and
confabulations. Hirst et al. (2009) have shown this to be the case
even when we are certain that our memories are accurate, as with
so-called “ﬂashbulb memories.” Moreover, conversations involv-
ing the recall of an important event can alter future recollections
(Coman et al., 2009), introducing more errors. Errors introduce
variation in our behavioral repertoires, and work as “mutations”
for behavior selection. Acting on the basis of a previous choice,
we may modify a behavior haphazardly to create a new option.
If the new behavior is reinforced, it may become the dominant
option around which further options are generated through hap-
hazard modiﬁcations. Indeed, the operation of selective forces on
errors may be a driving force in the production of creative thought
(Campbell, 1960).
OTHER PSYCHO-BIOLOGICAL FACTORS
At the individual-level, there are certainly other important fac-
tors that inﬂuence options. These include gender and biological
sex, age, working memory (Bechara et al., 2000; Hinson et al.,
2003), and cognitive biases such as framing and anchoring effects
(Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). Evolution has supplied humans
with useful decision making heuristics that work well under many
conditions of limited information (Gigerenzer et al., 1999) and
speciﬁc environmental structure (Bullock and Todd, 1999), the
neural processes of which have begun to be uncovered (Volz et al.,
2006). Additionally, individual differences related to both short-
and long-term behavioral tendencies (i.e., affect and personal-
ity, respectively) are inﬂuenced by hormonal and genetic factors
(Lee, 2008; Rilling et al., 2008). The nature of these inﬂuences
may involve complex interplay between perception, cognition, and
physiology (Wimsatt, 1972; Schank, 2001). Many facets of psy-
chology and neurobiology are at work in the generation of choice
options.
SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS
A decision is made by an individual and so, strictly speaking, all
relevant factors shaping and constraining options reduce to those
found within the individual, i.e., the psycho-biological factors
discussed above1. However, social forces enter into the decision
making processes of all social animals, and none more so than
humankind. Humans are unique in the animal kingdom for the
richness of their social ties and cultural phenomena, and for the
ability of their cultures to rapidly evolve (Richerson and Boyd,
2005). Many other species engage in complex social behaviors of
interest to decision scientists (deWaal and Tyack, 2003). The coor-
dinated ﬂocking behavior of birds in ﬂight, for example, requires
each individual to dynamically respond to its neighbors (Couzin,
2008), not to mention the intricate social dynamics found in non-
human primates (de Waal and Tyack, 2003; Cheney and Seyfarth,
2007). Due to the unique role culture plays in human behavior
(Chudek and Henrich, 2011), however, we will restrict this dis-
cussion to socio-cultural inﬂuences on human behavior, and the
generation of options for human decision making.
1This excludes collective decision processes, where the relevant behavior is at the
level of the group rather than that of each component individual, and represent
an extremely interesting line of research in their own right (e.g., Kerr and Tindale,
2004; Sumpter, 2006; Couzin, 2008).
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HUMANS ARE SOCIAL ANIMALS
Human cognition has been shaped by evolution to interpret and
react to the behavior and intentions of others, and to collaborate
and cooperate in shared goals in ways that differ fundamentally
from our nearest primate relatives (Tomasello et al., 2005; Csibra
and Gergely, 2009). There are many facets of humans as social ani-
mals that inﬂuence the options for decisions by interacting with
many of the individual-level psycho-biological processes men-
tioned above, the diversity of which this section offers a mere taste.
The drive to be social
Humans are not content to act in solitude, a fact recognized long
ago by Aristotle when he declared that “man is by nature a social
animal.” We have a seemingly intrinsic drive to be for company
and social acceptance, which will inﬂuence the options made in
social or potentially social situations. Loneliness, for example, is
a social emotion that inﬂuences perception and attention, which
in turn inﬂuence available options. For example, Cacioppo et al.
(2009) found that lonely individualswere less rewardedbypleasant
social stimuli (e.g., a rollercoaster or a man and a dog running),
and spent more time looking at images of social suffering than
non-lonely individuals. Further, the desire for companionship and
understanding is so strong that some individuals will even form
relationships with anthropomorphized inanimate objects in an
effort to stave off loneliness (Epley et al., 2008).
Social roles
Sociologists have long argued that one’s position within a society
plays a large part in determining the roles that one can adopt and
the actions that one can take (e.g., Goffman, 1974). These roles are
often domain speciﬁc and dependent on the social landscape – a
person behaves differently at work with her boss than at home
with her friends. A woman may behave very differently in situ-
ations with her children, in which her role as “mother” is more
salient, than in situations solely among her peers. On the other
hand, tendencies developed in one sphere of life can inﬂuence
behavior in other spheres. Kohn and Schoenbach (1983) found
that individuals whose jobs were more “self-directed” were more
likely to strive for autonomy in other domains, whereas those with
more constrained job opportunities tended to favor conformity
over autonomy. Importantly, these values of autonomy or con-
formity were transmitted both explicitly and implicitly to their
children. Emphasizing one value system over another will inﬂu-
ence an individual’s perceptions of situations as well as his goals
within those situations.
Social roles also inﬂuence how we respond to various individ-
uals. A generic social identity might drive behavior – we help an
elderly woman carrying a heavy object, but not a strong young
man. Our minds keep track of social relationships at the personal
and interpersonal level that are quite complex, and the relevant
schemas, motivations, and memories associated with those rela-
tionships inﬂuence the options and goals for decision making.
Social roles and relationships inﬂuence who we trust, who we
fear, and who we learn from. Humans’ amazing capacity for
social learning in particular is a large part of what makes our
species unique (Hermann et al., 2007), and who we target for
social learning is important. In addition to our parents, we turn
to people who are respected and venerated by others (Henrich
and Gil-White, 2001) – indeed, this choice constitutes a sort of
second-order social learning as we learn from whom to learn.
Humans also preferentially reward and learn from individuals that
are similar and punish, ostracize, or ignore those who are different
(Aronson, 2004). This tendency appears very early – 12-month-
olds preferentially copy the food selection choices of unfamiliar
adults who speak their language compared with similar targets
speaking a foreign language (Shutts et al., 2009).
Imitation, joint action, and emotion contagion
Our options for behaviors are inﬂuenced by what the people
around us are doing. This refers to more than just environmen-
tal constraints like “I can’t walk there because Joe’s in the way.”
Sociality is so deeply ingrained in humans that others’ behav-
iors can automatically trigger behavioral options in our brains.
The mirror neuron system (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004) is the
most famous example of this, but numerous brain networks in
which action and observation comingle have been identiﬁed for
sensations, emotions, and motor actions (Frith and Singer, 2008).
This link between observational and behavioral pathways facili-
tates social learning, allows us to coordinate in complex joint tasks
(Tomasello et al., 2005), and probably fosters social cohesion and
the propagation of cultural norms and regional idiosyncrasies.
When two people interact, they often unconsciously mimic each
other’s postures, mannerisms, and facial expressions (Chartrand
and Bargh, 1999). When this mimicry takes place, interactions
occur more smoothly and the partners tend to like each other
more (Lakin and Chartrand, 2003).
In addition to directly inﬂuencing options by activating behav-
iors, we can inﬂuence each others’ options by affecting their emo-
tional states with our own. This may involve the simple spread of
emotion, such as when we become fearful upon viewing another
person expressing fear (Morris et al., 1996), or a reactive set
of responses, such as exhibiting an expression of appeasement
(e.g., embarrassment) in response to another’s anger (Keltner and
Buswell, 1997).
Communication
We don’t get all our ideas from individual trial and error. While
observational learning (Bandura, 1986) is an important source
of information, we don’t socially learn solely by observation. The
direct communication of ideas through gesture, symbol, and lan-
guage represents a huge divide between humans and other species,
and gives us immediate access to options generatedbyotherminds.
Indeed, seeking the advice or consultation of a friend or colleague
can sometimes be an option in its own right. Whether solicited or
not, advice is often most useful when it proposes options that were
not previously considered, including the framing of a situation in
a new light. Supporting this idea, work by Page (2007) has shown
that groups are often best able to solve difﬁcult problems when
the constituent individuals are from diverse backgrounds, which
increases the number and breadth of available options.
HUMANS ARE CULTURAL ANIMALS
While all social animals are likely to be inﬂuenced by social
learning, social contagion, and communication, these are
hypertrophied in our species to create complex and diverse
cultures (Tomasello, 1999; Jablonka andLamb,2005). The tremen-
dous capacity for social learning coupled with an innate desire
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to learn the behaviors and customs of those around us leads to
differentiations in groups, including customs, norms, and eth-
nic markers. It has become increasingly apparent that culture can
fundamentally affect basic cognitive processes (Shore, 1996; Nis-
bett et al., 2001; Nisbett and Miyamoto, 2005), and that cognitive
universality is largely mythical. Indeed, the fact that most psycho-
logical research is conducted on Western undergraduates should
give us pause in considering how well we currently understand
human cognitive and behavioral tendencies (Henrich et al., 2010).
Culture guides social learning and shapes the schemas and asso-
ciative networks of what is proper and what is possible in various
circumstances – in other words, what behaviors are entertained
as options. Indeed, cultural experience may even shape the way
a given circumstance is perceived. A well-considered neural or
psychological theory of decision making cannot ignore culture.
Culture inﬂuences cognition
Nisbett and colleagues (Nisbett et al., 2001;Nisbett andMiyamoto,
2005; Na et al., 2010;Varnum et al., 2010) have argued persuasively
that many aspects of cognition and perception are fundamen-
tally dependent on cultural inﬂuences. Their research emphasizes
the differences between two general modes of thinking: the ana-
lytic style prevalent in the West, and the holistic style prevalent
in East Asia. Analytic thinking involves the decontextualization of
an object from its ﬁeld, a focus on attributes of an object used
to assign it into categories, and a preference for using rules about
the categories to explain and predict behavior. In contrast, holistic
thinking involves an orientation to the context or ﬁeld as a whole,
and a preference for explaining and predicting events based on
relationships. Holistic thinking tends to rely on experience-based
knowledge rather than abstract logic, and employs dialectic rea-
soning – emphasizing change, recognizing contradiction as an
inherent property in the universe, and promoting a search for
compromise in solutions.
These cultural differences in cognitive styles have been shown
to inﬂuence both perception and memory. In a study by Masuda
and Nisbett (2001), Japanese and American subjects were shown
animated underwater scenes with a focal animal (a ﬁsh) and
asked to describe what they had seen. The Japanese subjects were
more likely to mention background information and relation-
ships, whereas the Americans were more likely to concentrate on
the focal animal. During a later recognition task, Japanese sub-
jects had more difﬁculty remembering the focal animal if it was
shown against a different background than the one originally seen;
Americans did not show this effect. Cultural effects have also been
shown in the perception of social events. Westerners are much
more likely to explain another individual’s behavior in terms of
inherent personality traits,while EastAsians aremore likely to con-
sider explanations that take into account situational, contextual,
and societal factors (Nisbett et al., 2001). If an event is perceived in
a fundamentally different way, then it is probable that the options
for decisions regarding that event will also differ.
Culture explicitly dictates options
Different cultures may be associated with differences in the
physical environment, which alter decision making by providing
different behavioral affordances (Miyamoto et al., 2006). In
addition, cultural norms can inﬂuence options by suggesting or
restricting choices, or by determining which behaviors will achieve
speciﬁc social goals. We do not always cave to social pressures and
cultural norms, but these factors still inﬂuence options even when
we rebel. A secular teenager in an afﬂuent US suburb may rebel by
listening to hardcore punk music, while a rebellious teen in a fun-
damentalist religious community may get a thrill from sneaking a
listen to a mainstream pop station.
Cultures may vary in terms of which behaviors are salient or
even permitted. For example, cultures vary widely in the degree
to which young people can make their own decisions concerning
whom they marry (Buunk et al., 2010). A fascinating and some-
what horriﬁc illustration of this type of cultural inﬂuence is the
phenomenon of “bride abduction” in Central Asia (Werner, 2009).
In Kazakhstan, a man wishing to marry a woman may forcibly
abduct her, after which the woman is usually obligated to marry
her abductor. The man’s friends and family are often complicit in
the act, including actively assisting in the abduction and persuad-
ing or threatening the woman to accept the marriage. The bride
is sometimes an accomplice in her own abduction (such as when
she wishes to marry someone of whom her parents disapprove),
but this is not always the case. Because female modesty plays an
important role in a Kazakh family’s honor, “whether the abduc-
tion is consensual or not, it is the abduction itself that damages the
family’s honour and the bride’s acceptance of the marriage serves
to restore that honour” (Werner, 2009, p. 316). Werner further
notes “Many of the same people who. . . believe it is wrong for a
man to abduct a woman without her consent also believe that it is
wrong for an abductedwoman to reject themarriage”(p. 322). The
option to forcibly abduct a woman he wishes to marry, let alone to
recruit his friends and family to take part in the abduction, is not
an option that occurs to most men in parts of the world like the
United States, who are unaccustomed to the very concept of bride
abduction. Again, this is not a matter of choice evaluation. Werner
(2009) tells of a Kazakh man who was dissuaded from his original
intent to abduct a bride by the power of persuasive rhetoric. That
the origins of options are culturally inﬂuenced pertains to the fact
that the option even occurred to him in the ﬁrst place.
CONCLUSION
By focusing on choice behavior in the context of well-structured
problems with pre-deﬁned options, decision theorists limit the
scope of their future understanding of decision processes. We can-
not understand what we do not even try to study. Simon (1973)
posited that it was not an overstatement to suggest that no real-
world problems were well-structured in the way that experimental
paradigms were – and are – generally presented. We propose that,
to a large extend, problems become structured by the options that
an individual considers.
Understanding how the brain generates options for decision
making is a complex issue, and it is not clear that we are at
all close to being able to produce a serious neural or cognitive
theory. This is an open problem, and concerns neuroscientists,
psychologists, economists, and anyone interested in fundamen-
tal decision making processes. Generally speaking, all behavior
is decision making, and so a complete theory of behavior must
account for the generation of options. We have not provided such
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a theory. We have merely stated the problem, and pointed out a
wide array of factors for which a complete theory would need to
account. Some insights into the origins of options may potentially
be gleaned indirectly from previous decision making studies that
look at different types of option sets (e.g., veridical vs. adaptive
decision making), but these insights are limited because such stud-
ies have not considered the generation of options directly.We hope
that the explicit recognition of this problem prompts future work
toward a richer understanding of a fundamental component of
decision processes. Given the scientiﬁc community’s accelerating
knowledge of the organization and behavior of complex systems,
progress toward such an understanding seems very plausible.
In some settings, an individual’s choices may be so constrained
by social, cultural, and environmental factors (including legal and
moral factors) that the set of options is in practice common across
a wide range of individuals. In these cases, the available options
may be so uniform that the paradigms of traditional decision
making experiments seem applicable. This, however, still begs the
question concerning the internal mechanisms that generate those
admittedly commonoptions.Moreover,webelieve these situations
are less common that often believed. Although broad behavioral
patterns of individuals are statistically quite predictable in the
aggregate (Ariely, 2008; Barabási, 2010), the precise, moment-to-
moment behavior of individuals in naturalistic settings is inher-
ently unpredictable. As we discussed in our Introduction, even the
apparently simple and constrained act of ordering from a restau-
rant menu is rife with myriad factors that inﬂuence the available
options for choice.
In contrast to the currently prevailing approach in the decision
sciences of experiments with a priori options,we note that psycho-
logical experiments inwhichparticipants are allowed to respond in
any way afforded by their environments are far from non-existent.
Indeed, this type of experimental design has been common prac-
tice in social psychology since the 1960s. Such experiments, how-
ever, have thus far remained largely descriptive – e.g., people
in larger groups wait longer to intervene in a social emergency
(Darley and Latané, 1968); physical proximity, perceived power,
and individual differences inﬂuence how individuals respond to
counterintuitive orders from authority ﬁgures (Milgram, 1974);
deeply entrenched cultural differences inﬂuence both behavioral
and physiological responses to social insults (Cohen et al., 1996).
The idea of integrating free response into a more rigorous neuro-
science of human decision making is highly intriguing, though of
course presents difﬁculties for experimental design. For example,
implanted voltammetric microelectrodes have shed tremendous
light on the role of dopamine in the reward-seeking behavior
of free-moving rats (Phillips et al., 2003; Roitman et al., 2004),
but similar experiments are obviously not feasible for human
research. Bridging the gapbetweennaturalistic behavior and rigor-
ous scientiﬁc discovery of relevant decision mechanisms remains
an important challenge.
One possible direction for future research might be in uncov-
ering the neural bases for individual differences in option search
strategies. For example, Schwarz et al. (2002) devised a scale which
differentiated subjects’ tendencies either to seek more options in
a choice task or to prefer a limited set of options as long as one
met some threshold of worth, and called those at either end of the
scale maximizers and satisﬁcers, respectively.While we don’t know
if satisﬁcers and maximizers generate options in the same way, we
do know they have different strategies for processing options, and
that maximizers will evaluate more options when possible. These
differences provide a potential starting point for understanding
the neural bases for how the brain generates options. Another
useful paradigm might be one that could determine whether an
individual evaluated a given option (independent of ﬁnal choice),
or even whether two individuals consider the same options in a
particular task.
We encourage researchers in the cognitive and behavioral sci-
ences to start looking for neuralmechanisms and cognitivemodels
for the generation of options.We encourage all scientists interested
in decision making to move beyond the assumptions that choices
are (a) available a priori to the decision point, and (b) identical
for all actors. We note that we have only presented a small number
of options for future directions, but we are conﬁdent that creative
decision scientists will generate many more.
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